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Punitive in Effect: Reflections on 
Canada v. Whaling 
Hamish Stewart* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada decided only one case 
concerning the constitutional aspects of punishment. In Canada (Attorney 
General) v. Whaling,1 the Court held that the retrospective application of 
the abolition of accelerated parole review offended the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms2 right against double punishment. The decision 
did not touch on the constitutional merits of the abolition of accelerated 
parole review itself and in that sense concerned a merely transitional issue 
in sentencing and the administration of parole. It is nevertheless potentially 
significant because it is the first time that the Supreme Court of Canada 
has characterized a consequence of the commission of an offence as 
“punishment” based solely on its effect rather than on its purpose. It may 
therefore open up to Charter scrutiny a wide range of policy changes 
concerning the treatment of offenders. 
II. CHARTER RIGHTS RELATING TO PUNISHMENT 
The Charter provides (at least) four rights relating to punishment. 
First, section 12 provides that “Everyone has the right not to be subjected 
to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.” The Supreme Court 
of Canada has consistently held that to demonstrate a violation of section 12 
with respect to “punishment”, a Charter applicant must show that the 
punishment for the offence is “grossly disproportionate” in the sense that 
                                                                                                                                  
*  Faculty of law, University of Toronto. I am very grateful to an anonymous reviewer for 
comments on a draft and to Manasvin Goswami for research assistance. 
1  [2014] S.C.J. No. 20, 2014 SCC 20, [2014] 1 S.C.R 392 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Whaling”]. 
2  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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it is “...so excessive as to outrage standards of decency”.3 That is a high 
standard and is difficult for a Charter applicant to show.  
Section 11 contains two rights concerning punishment. Section 11(h) 
provides, as part of the more general guarantee against double jeopardy, 
that a person charged with an offence has the right “...if finally found  
guilty and punished for the offence, not to be … punished for it again”. 
Section 11(i) provides that where the penalty for an offence has been varied 
between the time the offence was committed and the time of sentencing, the 
offender has the right “to the benefit of the lesser punishment”. 
Finally, since an offender’s liberty under section 7 of the Charter is  
at stake in sentencing proceedings and in the conditions under which his  
or her sentence is served, he or she is entitled to the protection of the 
principles of fundamental justice throughout the process of being sentenced 
and of serving his or her sentence. Substantive principles of fundamental 
justice relevant to punishment, not expressly stated elsewhere in the 
Charter, arguably include a partial constitutionalization of the Kienapple 
rule4 against multiple convictions for the same wrong5 and the requirement 
that in the sentencing hearing the Crown prove contested aggravating 
factors beyond a reasonable doubt.6 
The section 11 rights concerning punishment are only triggered if an 
offender is “punished”. If the state does something to an offender that is 
not “punishment”, then they do not apply. The section 12 guarantee 
against cruel and unusual “treatment” would apply, as would the section 7 
principles of fundamental justice, to the extent that the state’s action 
affected the offender’s interest in liberty or security of the person. But 
the two punishment-related rights in section 11 do not apply unless the 
consequence of a finding of guilt is “punishment” for Charter purposes.  
In R. v. Wigglesworth,7 which concerned the relationship between a 
criminal charge and a police service offence, the Court defined 
“punishment” as follows: A consequence for an individual was 
“punishment” if it was imposed in proceedings of a criminal or quasi-
criminal nature, or, regardless of the nature of the proceedings, if it was 
“a true penal consequence” such as “imprisonment or a fine which by its 
magnitude would appear to be imposed for the purpose of redressing the 
                                                                                                                                  
3  R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, at 1072 (S.C.C.). 
4  R. v. Kienapple, [1974] S.C.J. No. 76, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729 (S.C.C.). 
5  On this possibility, see most recently, R. v. Meszaros, [2013] O.J. No. 5113, 2013 ONCA 
682, at paras. 62-68 (Ont. C.A.). 
6  R. v. D.B., [2008] S.C.J. No. 25, 2008 SCC 25, at para. 78 (S.C.C.). 
7  [1987] S.C.J. No. 71, 37 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Wigglesworth”]. 
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wrong done to society at large rather than for the maintenance of internal 
discipline” within a regulated area of conduct.8 On that test, a sanction 
imposed on an RCMP officer for a service offence did not preclude 
criminal punishment following a subsequent prosecution based on the 
same conduct. The first sanction was not “punishment” in the Charter 
sense. In R. v. Rodgers, where the issue was the nature of the consequence 
rather than the nature of the proceedings, the Court held that a 
consequence amounted to “punishment” if it satisfied this two-part  
test: “…the consequence will constitute a punishment when [1] it forms 
part of the arsenal of sanctions to which an accused may be liable in 
respect of a particular offence and [2] the sanction is one imposed in 
furtherance of the purpose and principles of sentencing”.9 The Court held 
that the requirement that a convicted offender provide a bodily sample 
for forensic DNA analysis was not part of the “arsenal of sanctions”; it 
was more akin to taking fingerprints or photographs of a suspect.10 The 
law authorizing the taking of such samples from previously convicted 
offenders therefore did not violate section 11(h) of the Charter. 
The picture that emerges from these early cases is that a consequence 
is likely to be characterized as punishment for Charter purposes if it has a 
punitive purpose, that is, a purpose of “redressing wrongs done to society 
at large”.11 A traditional consequence such as imprisonment, probation, 
or a fine will almost certainly be so characterized, but non-traditional 
consequences will not be unless they can be shown to have a punitive 
purpose.  
III. WHALING AND THE MEANING OF “PUNISHMENT” 
In 2011, Parliament enacted the Abolition of Early Parole Act 
(“AEPA”),12 amending the Corrections and Conditional Release Act,13 to 
eliminate the possibility of “accelerated parole review”. The application 
of the AEPA was expressly retrospective: section 10(2) provided that 
offenders who had already been sentenced would not be eligible for 
                                                                                                                                  
8  Id., at 400-402. 
9  [2006] S.C.J. No. 15, 2006 SCC 15 at para. 63 (S.C.C.) [numbering added; hereinafter 
“Rodgers”]. 
10  Id., at para. 65. 
11  R. v. Shubley, [1990] S.C.J. No. 1, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 3, at 32 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Shubley”], 
and compare at 20. 
12  S.C. 2011, c. 11. 
13  S.C. 1992, c. 20. 
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accelerated parole review. The applicants in Whaling were three 
offenders who were already serving federal sentences when the AEPA 
came into force and whose eligibility for parole had as a result been 
delayed: in the case of the applicant Maidana, by 21 months. They argued 
that the retroactive application of AEPA violated their section 11(h) right 
not to be punished again for their offences. But that right would apply 
only if delaying their eligibility for parole was a form of “punishment” 
for Charter purposes. 
The claim that variations in parole eligibility are forms of 
“punishment” is not an easy one to make. An offender who is on parole is 
still serving the sentence originally imposed following conviction. He or 
she is liable to have parole revoked on various grounds. So it might be 
argued that changing the timing of or conditions for parole eligibility is 
not additional “punishment” (though it would be subject to scrutiny 
under section 7 since it would affect the offender’s liberty interest14). It is 
merely a change in the way the sentence is served. 
The Government’s argument that the abolition of accelerated parole 
was not “punishment” was not quite so straightforward as that. The 
Government argued, first, that because the delay in parole ineligibility 
was not imposed following a new proceeding, it did not count as 
“punishment” on the Wigglesworth approach.15 The Court rightly 
rejected this submission. As Wagner J. points out, it would be very odd 
indeed if it was constitutionally easier for the state “to punish someone 
without a proceeding than to punish him or her with a proceeding”.16 If 
                                                                                                                                  
14  A change in the parole regime was subject to Charter challenge in Cunningham v. 
Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 47, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.). The Court recognized that the change 
implicated an offender’s liberty interest, but dismissed the challenge on other grounds. In Whaling, 
the Court found it unnecessary to decide the applicants’ s. 7 claim: Whaling, supra, note 1, at  
paras. 75-76. A change in parole regimes would also be subject to scrutiny under the Charter 
requirement that detention not be arbitrary (s. 9) and the common law requirement that detention be 
lawful (Mission Institution v. Khela, [2014] S.C.J. No. 24, 2014 SCC 24 (S.C.C.); May v. Ferndale 
Institution, [2005] S.C.J. No. 84, 2005 SCC 82 (S.C.C.)). State action in compliance with the statute 
would satisfy the common law requirement; the question whether the statute itself was “arbitrary” 
for s. 9 purposes would overlap with the s. 7 question of whether it complied with the principles of 
fundamental justice. 
15  A slightly different version of this argument had already been considered and rejected in 
Rodgers. A peace officer’s application for an order requiring previously convicted offenders provide 
a bodily sample for forensic DNA analysis was not a proceeding in which the offender was, in the 
opening words of s. 11, “charged with an offence”. The Court held the s. 11(h) guarantee against 
double punishment would nevertheless apply because the consequence flowed from the original 
conviction. Rodgers, supra, note 9, at para. 58. Any other reading would make the s. 11(h) guarantee 
virtually meaningless. (The Court went on to hold that the consequence was not “punishment”.)  
16  Whaling, supra, note 1, at para. 38. 
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the Government’s interpretation of section 11(h) was correct, not only 
would the retroactive application of AEPA not violate double jeopardy, 
neither would a statute that automatically added a year of imprisonment 
to the sentences of all previously convicted offenders or that gave the 
Commissioner of the Correctional Service of Canada a discretion to 
continue the detention of any offenders after the expiration of their 
sentences. Such a law would be subject to challenge under sections 7 and 
12 of the Charter — but it would not be a form of double punishment. 
That would be a very implausible conclusion. 
The Government’s second argument was much stronger. It was, 
simply, that a delay in parole eligibility was not punishment on the 
Rodgers definition. The Court essentially accepted that argument. With 
some hesitation, the Court agreed with the Government’s submission that 
the purpose of retroactively applying the AEPA was not to pursue the 
traditional sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence by 
punishing offenders who were already serving sentences but merely to 
achieve uniformity in the application of the legitimate policy objective of 
abolishing early parole.17 Thus, the abolition of early parole eligibility 
was “neither a second proceeding nor a ‘sanction’ in the sense contemplated 
in Rodgers”.18 
One would expect the constitutional challenge to fail at this point. 
But the Court avoided that conclusion by expanding its conception of 
punishment. Evidently troubled by what was functionally an increase in 
the harshness of the sentences of previously convicted offenders, the 
Court held that the Rodgers test was concerned with the characterization 
of “a discrete sanction — one that does not modify the original sanction”; 
but the issue here was how to characterize a modification of an existing 
sanction.19 Abolition of early parole eligibility created a situation where 
“from a functional rather than a formalistic perspective, the harshness of 
punishment has been increased”.20 As usual, it is not clear what the Court 
means by contrasting the formal (bad) with the functional (good), but the 
Court was evidently concerned to recognize the constitutional significance 
of the increase in the proportion of their sentence that previously 
convicted offenders would serve in the penitentiary rather than on parole. 
So, for the purposes of applying the section 11(h) right against double 
                                                                                                                                  
17  Whaling, id., at para. 68. 
18  Id., at para. 49. 
19  Id., at para. 52. 
20  Id., at para. 52. 
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punishment, “punishment” now means any of the following three “state 
actions in relation to the same offence”: 
(a) a proceeding that is criminal or quasi-criminal in nature …; 
(b) an additional sanction or consequence that meets the two-part 
Rodgers test for punishment … in that it is similar in nature to the 
types of sanctions available under the Criminal Code and is imposed 
in furtherance of the purpose and principles of sentencing; and 
(c) retrospective changes to the conditions of the original sanction 
which have the effect of adding to the offender’s punishment….21 
Not every effect on an existing sentence will constitute “punishment” 
for this purpose. Though the Court was reluctant to define exactly what 
effect would count, the basic idea was that a law having a sufficiently 
significant impact on “an offender’s settled expectation of liberty” would 
constitute fresh punishment and would therefore violate section 11(h).22 
Applying this idea to the AEPA, the Court found that although 
Parliament’s purpose in abolishing accelerated parole review was not 
punitive, the abolition was punitive in effect. It was “a lengthening of the 
minimum period of incarceration for persons … who would have qualified 
for early day parole under the APR system”; it was imposed 
“automatical[ly] and without regard to individual circumstances”.23 It was 
therefore “double punishment” and offended section 11(h) of the Charter.24 
The Court found that the violation of section 11(h) was not justified 
under section 1. At the first stage of the Oakes test25 for justifying a limit 
on a Charter right, the state must show that the limit has a pressing and 
substantial objective. The Court agreed with the trial judge’s finding that 
that the objective of the AEPA in general, and of its retrospective 
application in particular,26 was pressing and substantial: “ensuring that 
sentences as administered are consistent with the sentences courts 
impose, which, by extension, includes maintaining or restoring public 
                                                                                                                                  
21  Id., at para. 54. 
22  Id., at para. 60. 
23  Id., at paras. 70-71. 
24  Id., at para. 72. 
25  R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
26  Thus, the Court avoided the frequent error of considering the objective of the legislation 
in general, rather than the objective of the limit on the Charter right, to be pressing and substantial. It 
happens in this case that these two objectives are the same, but while the former provides essential 
context for determining the latter, they are not always identical, and it is the limit on the right, not 
the legislation in general, that must be justified under s. 1. 
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confidence in the administration of justice”.27 However, the Court found 
that the retrospective application of the AEPA was not proportional 
because it was not minimally impairing: the Government had not shown 
that prospective application only “would have significantly undermined 
[Parliament’s] objectives”.28 In other words, Parliament had open to it the 
less rights-impairing alternative of not violating the section 11(h) right at 
all. Although expressed as a lack of minimal impairment, this amounts to 
saying that the rights infringement was not necessary to Parliament’s 
objective and so not proportional because not rationally connected. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
Whaling is the first case where the Supreme Court of Canada has 
found that a consequence of conviction amounts to “punishment” for 
Charter purposes solely because of its effects rather than because of its 
purposes. While the Court has on occasion considered the magnitude of a 
consequence, and thus its effect on the offender, as a factor in 
determining the legislature’s purpose,29 it has never previously held that a 
consequence, though not punitive in its purpose, was punishment 
because it was punitive in its effect. While the reasoning in Whaling is 
specifically limited to the context of a new consequence imposed on 
offenders already serving their sentences, and moreover to section 11(h), 
this new willingness to consider effect as well as purpose could have a 
number of implications for constitutional review of newly invented 
consequences of conviction. 
Consider, for example, the question whether a victim surcharge 
imposed under section 737 of the Criminal Code30 is “punishment” for 
the purpose of section 7, 11, or 12 of the Charter. Section 737(1) provides 
that a person who is convicted or discharged “shall pay a victim surcharge, 
in addition to any other punishments imposed”. Section 737(2)(a) provides 
that the surcharge is 30 per cent of any fine imposed; if no fine is 
imposed, section 737(2)(b) provides that the surcharge is $100 for a  
 
                                                                                                                                  
27  Whaling, supra, note 1, at para. 78. 
28  Id., at para. 80. 
29  In Shubley, supra, note 11, at 23, for example, the Court commented that the penalties 
imposed in a prison discipline proceeding were “entirely commensurate with the goal of fostering 
internal prison discipline and … not of a magnitude or consequence that would be expected for 
redressing wrongs done to society at large”. 
30  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter “Criminal Code”]. 
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summary conviction offence and $200 for an offence punishable by 
indictment. Courts in Ontario have reached different conclusions on the 
question whether this surcharge is “punishment”. In his impressively 
reasoned and sensitively written decision in Michael,31 Paciocco J. of the 
Ontario Court of Justice concluded that a victim surcharge was not only 
punishment but was cruel and unusual punishment under section 12.32 
Justice Paciocco’s reasoning on the first point was straightforward: the 
victim surcharge satisfied both elements of the Rodgers test. The victim 
surcharge was, in essence, a fine and therefore part of the traditional 
arsenal of sanctions. Section 737(1) referred to it as being imposed “in 
addition to any other punishment”, suggesting that it is indeed a 
punishment. Moreover, Paciocco J. noted that “only offenders pay the 
victim surcharge and they do so as part of the sentencing process” and 
that the victim surcharge fell within the definition of a “fine” in section 716, 
that is “a pecuniary penalty or other sum of money, but … not … 
restitution.”33 As for the Crown’s submission that the victim surcharge 
was indeed a type of restitution and therefore not a fine, he noted that the 
surcharge did not appear in the Code sections concerning restitution. The 
surcharge went into a fund which was used “for the purposes of 
providing … assistance to the victims of offences” (section 737(7)), not 
restitution to particular victims, let alone the offender’s victims; 
moreover, it was unrelated to the loss caused.34 Rather, it was imposed 
“to make offenders pay for their crimes”, not to the specific victim, but to 
society in general.35 He then went on to hold that the surcharge was cruel 
and unusual because it was grossly disproportionate on the facts of a 
reasonable hypothetical: the facts of the very case before him, slightly 
adjusted.36 The offender was liable to a victim surcharge of $900. He was 
                                                                                                                                  
31  R. v. Michael, [2014] O.J. No. 3609, 2014 ONCJ 360, 314 C.C.C. (3d) 180 (Ont. C.J.) 
[hereinafter “Michael”]. 
32  Section 737(5), which provided for an exemption on the application of the offender if the 
victim surcharge would cause “undue hardship” to the offender or his/her dependants, was repealed 
in 2013. If this discretion was still available, it would likely be a complete answer to the claim that 
the victim surcharge was cruel and unusual.  
33  Id., at paras. 8 and 11. 
34  Id., at para. 13. 
35  Id., at para. 8. 
36  On the facts of the case, Paciocco J. could have avoided imposing the victim surcharge of 
$900 by imposing a nominal fine (e.g., $1.00) for each offence; according to s. 737(2)(a), the 
surcharge would be 15 per cent of that fine, for a total of $10.35. It is questionable whether this 
device is consistent with the policy behind the repeal of s. 737(5). But it is in any event not available 
where the offender cannot be fined: in those cases, the offender must pay the minimum victim 
surcharge of $50 or $100, as the case may be, laid out in s. 737(2)(b). For example, an offender 
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a drug- and alcohol-addicted repeat offender who had no prospect of ever 
paying it. The impact on his life of the lingering effect of an unpaid 
victim surcharge was grossly disproportionate to the relatively minor 
offence of which he had been convicted.37 
In contrast, in R. v. Tinker, Glass J. of the Superior Court of Justice 
of Ontario held, for section 7 purposes, that the victim surcharge was not 
a fine: 
I do not read a surcharge to be a fine. It is not in the form of a penalty. It 
flows from a conviction for a crime, but it is not a sanction in its own 
right. Rather, it is … a sum of money established to be a consequence of 
breaking the law. That is different from a sanction because is it not in the 
same category as a fine, a tax, or a penalty. Rather, the surcharge is a sum 
of money that goes into a pool of resources to help victims of crime.38 
Both of these interpretations of the victim surcharge are possible; 
neither depends on any assessment of the effects of the victim surcharge 
on the offender. Justice Paciocco’s is preferable, because of the wording 
of section 737(1), the close analogy between the surcharge and a fine, 
and the weak link between the surcharge and any restitutionary purpose. 
But if, in light of Whaling, it is permissible to consider the effect of a 
consequence as well as its purpose in determining whether the 
consequence is “punishment” for Charter purposes, then the case for 
characterizing the victim surcharge as a punishment is even stronger. In 
Michael, the offender was extremely impoverished and had no hope of 
ever paying the $900 victim surcharge to which he was liable. The 
prospect of harassment by collection agencies and imprisonment for non-
payment would hang over him indefinitely and he would never be able to 
apply for a record suspension; he would, in effect, never be able to repay 
his debt to society for the relatively minor offences of which he had been 
found guilty.39 Justice Paciocco made these observations in assessing 
whether the victim surcharge was cruel and unusual for Charter 
                                                                                                             
cannot be fined where he or she is discharged rather than convicted because only a convicted 
offender can be fined (ss. 731, 734); and an offender cannot be fined where he or she is sentenced to 
imprisonment followed by probation (at least, that is how the predecessor of s. 731(1)(b) has been 
interpreted in Ontario and Quebec: R. v. Blacquierre, [1975] O.J. No. 443, 24 C.C.C. (2d) 168 (Ont. 
C.A.); R. c. St. James, [1981] J.Q. no 163, 20 C.R. (3d) 389 (Que. C.A.)). So, the reasonable 
hypothetical consisted of the facts of Michael’s case on the assumption that he was an offender who 
could not be fined. 
37  Michael, supra, note 31, at paras. 58-81. 
38  [2015] O.J. No. 1758, 2015 ONSC 2284, at para. 29 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
39  Michael, supra, note 31, at paras. 70-88. 
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purposes; but after Whaling, they may be equally relevant to the question 
whether the surcharge is punishment in the first place. Moreover, as he 
says at the outset of his reasons for judgment: 
[Whaling holds that] a provision that increases the period of 
incarceration to be served is necessarily a punishment. The same holds 
true … for a provision like s. 737, which enhances the amount of any 
fine that must be paid. How can a fine be a paradigmatic example of a 
punishment, yet a provision adding 30% to the amount of a fine, not be 
a punishment?40  
While Paciocco J. may have overstated the ratio of Whaling, his 
analogy between the effective length of the period of imprisonment and 
the effective size of the fine is nevertheless compelling. 
Second, consider whether the registration requirement for sexual 
offenders is a form of punishment. Canadian courts have almost uniformly 
ruled that it is not. The purpose of the registration requirement is said to be 
facilitating the investigation of crime rather than punishing the offender.41 
That is probably right as far as it goes. But registration has a very 
significant effect on an offender’s liberty: for a minimum of 10 years and 
in some cases for life, the offender must register annually, provide 
considerable personal information, report any change within seven days, 
and report every anticipated absence of more than seven days from his 
residence.42 Failure to comply with these obligations is an offence 
punishable by imprisonment.43 The impact of the registration requirement 
on liberty is relevant not only for the purpose of engaging section 7 of the 
Charter,44 but also for the comparison with consequences that undoubtedly 
do constitute punishment: imprisonment and probation. Moreover, these 
registration obligations are imposed only on those who commit sexual 
offences and on no one else. To the extent that effect as well as purpose is 
                                                                                                                                  
40  Michael, id., at para. 5. This thought is, however, not strictly speaking part of the ratio of 
the decision. 
41  See, for example, R. v. B. (C.L.) [R. v. C.L.B.], [2010] A.J. No. 451, 253 C.C.C. (3d) 486 
(Alta. C.A.); R. v. C. (S.S.) [R. v. S.S.C.], [2008] B.C.J. No. 1148, 234 C.C.C. (3d) 365 (B.C.C.A.);  
R. v. Cross, [2006] N.S.J. No. 87, 205 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (N.S.C.A.). 
42  Sex Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10, ss. 4-6. 
43  Criminal Code, supra, note 30, at ss. 490.031, 490.0311, 490.0312. 
44  Any restriction on conduct punishable by imprisonment engages the s. 7 liberty interest: 
Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) s. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 
486 (S.C.C.). As for the registration requirements themselves — as opposed to punishment for 
failing to comply with them — it might be arguable that they touch on the basic liberty interest to 
move around Canada: compare R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.). 
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relevant to the characterization, the case for characterizing sexual offender 
registration as punishment is strong. 
Third, consider the intriguing question raised in Guindon v. Canada.45 
In that case, pursuant to section 163.2 of the Income Tax Act,46 the 
Canada Revenue Agency assessed a penalty of $565,000 against the 
taxpayer, a lawyer who had vouched for a fraudulent charitable scheme. 
In proceedings to challenge the assessment, the taxpayer argued that she 
was “charged with an offence” so as to engage her rights under section 11 
of the Charter, in particular the presumption of innocence. The Tax Court 
of Canada held that she was indeed charged with an offence. The Federal 
Court of Appeal set this holding aside on procedural grounds. In the 
alternative, the Court of Appeal held that the taxpayer was not charged 
with an offence because (among other considerations) penalties imposed 
under the Income Tax Act were “not about condemning morally 
blameworthy conduct or inviting societal condemnation of the conduct … 
[but] about ensuring that this discrete regulatory and administrative field of 
endeavour works properly”.47 This reasoning relies on the pre-Whaling 
distinction between punishments and other consequences, but is applied 
here to help determine the nature of the proceedings faced by the taxpayer. 
To the extent that Whaling licenses courts to consider the effects as well as 
the purposes of state action in characterizing the nature of a consequence, 
it certainly seemed to strengthen the taxpayer’s case. The more the 
$565,000 assessment looks like punishment in the form of a fine for the 
taxpayer’s alleged wilful disregard for the requirements of the Income Tax 
Act, the more likely the proceedings that lead to its imposition would be 
subject to the procedural rights in section 11 of the Charter. In the end, the 
Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Guindon without reference to Whaling, but Whaling nevertheless 
strengthens any argument that seeks to characterize a consequence as penal 
based on its effect as well as its purpose. 
Finally, Whaling has been invoked to support the submission that 
changes in the legislative treatment of pre-trial custody are punitive, once 
again because of their effect rather than because of their purpose. The 
Truth in Sentencing Act48 imposed an upper limit of 1.5:1 on an offender’s 
                                                                                                                                  
45  [2013] F.C.J. No. 673, 2013 FCA 153 (Fed. C.A.) [hereinafter “Guindon”], affd [2015] 
S.C.J. No. 41, 2015 SCC 41 (S.C.C.). 
46  R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.). 
47  Guindon, supra, note 45, at para. 41, citing Wigglesworth in support of this point. 
48  S.C. 2009, c. 29. 
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credit for pre-trial custody. Prior to that Act, it was common for  
offenders to receive 2:1 credit, or sometimes even more depending on the 
conditions of their pre-trial detention. In R.S., without any real 
consideration of the purpose of the Truth in Sentencing Act, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal held that it effectively imposed greater punishment on 
offenders.49 Its application to offenders who committed their offences 
before it came into force was therefore inconsistent with the right to the 
“benefit of the lesser punishment” under section 11(i) of the Charter.50 
V. CONCLUSION 
The earliest Charter cases established, as a general rule, that Charter 
rights could be engaged either by state conduct that was intended to 
violate them or, much more commonly, by state conduct that affected the 
interests that they protected. The right to freedom of religion in  
section 2(a) of the Charter is engaged by legislation that affects the 
exercise of religion;51 the right to freedom of expression in section 2(b) is 
engaged by legislation that affects expression;52 the right to liberty in 
section 7 of the Charter is engaged by state conduct that results in 
detention.53 In none of these scenarios is it necessary for the Charter 
applicant to show that the state intended to affect or to limit the relevant 
Charter rights (though that would be sufficient). But, for reasons that are 
unclear, the Court has been reluctant to take the same approach to the 
section 11 rights concerning punishment. Consequences of conviction 
that do not have a punitive purpose have generally been exempt from 
scrutiny under section 11(h) or (i) of the Charter. 
This reluctance reached an illogical extreme in Rodgers. The issue 
there was whether the requirement that convicted or discharged offenders 
provide a bodily sample for forensic DNA analysis was a form of 
“punishment”. It was not, apparently because it had a non-punitive 
                                                                                                                                  
49  R. v. S. (R.), [2015] O.J. No. 2183, at paras. 30-31 (Ont. C.A.). 
50  In Liang v. Canada (Attorney General), [2014] B.C.J. No. 962, 2014 BCCA 190, 311 
C.C.C. (3d) 159 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 298 (S.C.C.), the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal held that the AEPA offended s. 11(i). This result flows very 
straightforwardly from Whaling. 
51  R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.). 
52  Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Québec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 
(S.C.C.). 
53  Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, 2007 SCC 9 
(S.C.C.). 
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purpose; and, Charron J. added, no one would say that other laws with 
deterrent effects or facilitating the investigation of crime, such as RIDE 
spot checks or the taking of photographs or fingerprints, were forms of 
punishment, even though, like imprisonment, they might well have a 
deterrent effect.54 But the argument was not that every consequence 
flowing from a law that deters crime or facilitates the investigation of 
crime was punishment; the argument was rather that burdensome 
consequences of findings of guilt were punishment. And law enforcement 
measures such as RIDE spot checks and the taking of fingerprints are not 
consequences of findings of guilt, whereas the requirement to provide a 
bodily sample is a consequence of such a finding. 
While the precise scope of Whaling is far from clear, the decision turns 
on a very welcome recognition that the consequences of a conviction can 
be construed as punishment not only because of their punitive purposes  
but also because of their burdensome effects. This does not, of course, 
mean that every newly invented consequence of conviction will be 
characterized as punishment. But it does mean that those consequences can 
be scrutinized for compliance with the basic principles of prospectivity and 
proportionality enshrined in sections 11 and 12 of the Charter. 
                                                                                                                                  
54  Rodgers, supra, note 9, at para. 64. 
 
 
